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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
INVOLVING EUROPEAN AGENCIES 
EDOARDO CHITI* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Between 1996 and 2002, 294,625 applications were submitted for Community 
trademarks and 168,190 were actually registered.  In the same period, there were more 
than 10,000 applications filed for a Community plant variety right, and about 7,000 of 
these rights are currently in force.  And between 2000 and 2002, out of 149 applica-
tions submitted to place a pharmaceutical product on the internal market, 113 authori-
zations were granted. 
All these cases have required the intervention of a supranational office provided 
with a legal personality, known, in the jargon of European Community (EC) institu-
tions, as the “European agency.”  Contrary to what one might expect, the relevant ad-
ministrative action is not  carried out exclusively by such an office.  Rather, the 
Community’s administrative function is exercised jointly by a plurality of suprana-
tional, national, and mixed authorities, according to a complex institutional design laid 
down by EC legislation.1 
The purpose of this Article is to reconstruct the peculiar features of proceedings 
involving European agencies by analyzing the relevant positive law, administrative 
practice, and case law.  This is to ascertain, in part, what is distinctive about these pro-
ceedings, as compared to the other procedural models that are progressively emerging 
in the Community legal order.  More generally, the study of proceedings involving 
European agencies aims at contributing to the discussion about the originality of 
European administrative law vis-à-vis the administrative traditions of the Member 
States.2 
Before beginning this analysis, it is necessary to give a clear definition of what is 
meant here by “European agency” in order to delimit the exact scope of the inquiry.  
The expression “European agency” is often used by EC institutions and European 
scholars with reference to a wide range of organizational models that are not always 
homogeneous.  For the purposes of this study, the phrase “European agency” refers to 
any Community office that is (a) endowed with legal personality and legal tasks by the 
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 1. Edoardo Chiti, Decentralised Integration as a New Model of Joint Exercise of Community Functions: 
A Legal Analysis of European Agencies, 10 EUR. PUB. L. REV. 1267 (2003). 
 2. Sabino Cassese, Il diritto amministrativo europeo presenta caratteri originali?, 53 RIVISTA 
TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO 35, 50-51 (2003). 
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supranational, European legislation, (b) auxiliary to central Community administra-
tion, i.e., the European Commission, (c) constituted of a number of collegial bodies 
composed of representatives of various national and European authorities, and (d) 
characterized, in functional terms, as essentially aimed at realizing a technical or ad-
ministrative decentralization ensuring at the same time the collaboration among a va-
riety of national authorities, and between them and the supranational institutions.3  
Accordingly, this analysis will not include proceedings involving highly specialized 
offices that closely assist the Commission, acting outside a systematic and structured 
relationship with national authorities.4  Nor will it consider proceedings before Euro-
pean authorities that are independent of Community central administration, govern-
ments of the Member States, and private power.5 
II 
PROCEDURALIZATION AND COMPOSITION OF THE COMPETENT OFFICES 
A number of distinctive features characterize the proceedings involving European 
agencies.  The first is that they combine supranational, national, and mixed admini-
strations in the context of “common systems”6 created by Community laws regulating 
particular sectors. 
As one might anticipate, these provisions have not delegated European agencies 
all the powers necessary to carry out the various administrative functions.   Rather, 
these functions have been distributed among a plurality of European and national ad-
ministrations, as well as among offices composed of representatives of both levels of 
administration.  This requires composite tools, among which is the articulation of the 
administrative function in procedural sequences that ensure the interconnection and 
the interdependence between the various competent offices.  For instance, Council 
 
 3. This is the case in the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 
the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, the European Environment Agency, the 
European Training Foundation, the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, the European 
Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market, the 
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, the Translation Centre for Bodies of the European Union, the 
Community Plant Variety Office, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, the European 
Agency for Reconstruction and the European Maritime Safety Agency.  For an overall account of the subject 
see EDOARDO CHITI, LE AGENZIE EUROPEE. UNITÀ E DECENTRAMENTO NELLE AMMINISTRAZIONI 
COMUNITARIE (2002). 
 4. One such agency is the European Aviation Safety Agency and the “executive agencies” to be entrusted 
with certain tasks in the management of Community programs.  On the latter, envisioned by Council Regulation 
58/2003, 2002 O.J. (L 120) 1, see Paul Craig, A New Framework for EU Administration: The Financial Regula-
tion 2002, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (Winter 2004). 
 5. The most prominent example is the European Central Bank, on which see the detailed analyses by 
CHIARA ZILIOLI and MARTIN SELMAYR, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2001).  See also 
ALBERTO MALATESTA, LA BANCA CENTRALE EUROPEA (2003).  A more recent example is provided by the 
establishment of the European Food Safety Authority.  See Sabino Cassese, La nuova disciplina alimentare 
europea, in PER UN’AUTORITÀ NAZIONALE DELLA SICUREZZA ALIMENTARE, 13 et seq., (Sabino Cassese ed. 
2002).  For a synthetic account on the growing tendency to establish independent authorities at the Community 
level see EDOARDO CHITI and CLAUDIO FRANCHINI, L’INTEGRAZIONE AMMINISTRATIVA EUROPEA, 78 et seq., 
(2003). 
 6. See Sabino Cassese, European Administrative Proceedings, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 22 
(Winter 2004). 
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Regulation 40/94, establishing a Community trademark, provides a procedure for reg-
istering a Community trademark and a procedure for converting a Community trade-
mark, or a Community trademark application, into a national trademark application.7  
In both cases, the relevant powers are distributed between the Community office and 
national industrial property offices according to a criterion of complementariness 
based on the distinction between decisionmaking and the activities that serve to pre-
pare or execute such decisions.  Thus with regard to registration procedure, the offices 
of the Member States grant the Community office technical assistance, and the proce-
dure concludes with a measure adopted by the supranational administration.8  The re-
verse happens in proceedings to convert to a national trademark application, since the 
decision on the admissibility of the request for conversion is taken by the competent 
national office, while the European body forwards the application and all the relevant 
information to the national office.9  The main element of such a process is the mutual 
assistance afforded by Community and national agencies to one another—that is, rela-
tionships in which one office performs tasks that are instrumental to a final decision 
taken by a second office. It is a reciprocal auxiliary relationship, since either body—
the Community or that national office—can operate, according to the particular case, 
in the capacity of the other. 10  Therefore, the distinction between decisionmaking and 
assistance activity is not a static relationship between center and periphery, in which 
the European office is the principal decisionmaker, assisted by national administra-
tion.  Rather, the Community administrative outline is based upon two complementary 
and interdependent poles, both of which, according to the procedure, can play the role 
of main and of auxiliary subject.11 
In contrast, interdependence is accomplished in other cases through a more elabo-
rate structure.  One example is the centralized procedure of pharmaceutical product 
authorization, regulated by European Parliament and Council Regulation 726/2004.  
First, the different offices involved are made interdependent mainly through relation-
ships giving them equal ranking.  According to these relationships, established by sev-
eral procedural provisions, an office is obligated to involve a second office in the pro-
ceedings when it exercises a given power.12  Further, such relationships are established 
not only between Community offices and Member States’ administrations, but also 
between these and mixed organizations, functional both to the development of a tech-
 
 7. Council Regulation 40/94, art. 36 et seq., 108 et seq., 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1. 
 8. For instance, the national offices assist the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market with secre-
tarial activities when the application is filed with theindustrial property office of a Member State; they also 
search their own register of trade marks to assist with Community trade marks applications. Council Regulation 
40/94, art. 25(2), 39, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1. 
 9. Council Regulation 40/94, art. 109(3), 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1. 
 10. On the notion of auxiliarity, see MASSIMO SEVERO GIANNINI, DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO 317 (3d ed. 
1993). 
 11. Even if the organizational relationships are arranged mainly through procedural means, this does not 
exclude the provision of some permanent and general relations concerning the activity of the subjects in all the 
procedures for the administration of Community trade marks.  Council Regulation 40/94, art. 86-87, 1994 O.J. 
(L 11) 1. 
 12. For a detailed analysis of Council Regulation 2309/1993, 1993 O.J. (L 214) 1, on which the overall 
scheme for the new regime was laid down by Council Regulation 726/2004, O.J. (L 136) 1, see EDOARDO 
CHITI,  supra note 3, at 201. 
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nical deliberation among experts on specific scientific issues, and to the congruence of 
national with supranational interests.  Therefore, this case is different from the case of 
Community trademark administration.  If in the latter instance each office is called to 
act as an auxiliary to the others in order to fulfill a Community interest, the centralized 
procedure of pharmaceutical product authorization represents a legally more complex 
construction, founded on the juxtaposition (in the context of a procedure regulated by 
Community law) of plural centers of reference.  The resulting pattern is based on the 
presupposition that public health can be looked after only through the combination of 
plural and complementary points of view examining the different aspects involved.  
Scientific analysis is performed by transnational bodies, and the administrative 
evaluation is carried out by centers of reference representing the national and suprana-
tional interest, as well as by bodies that act as a composite of such interests. 
These two examples show that Community legislation regulates procedure differ-
ently in each policy area. Beyond these differences, however, the European provisions 
share two elements.  On the one hand, the function is proceduralized by European leg-
islation setting down a number of procedural steps which require the intervention not 
only of Community administrations, but also of national and composite administra-
tions.  On the other hand, European legislation establishes a number of organizational 
relationships between the various public authorities with power in a particular area.  
These relationships are necessary for functional integration. 
This outline identifies what is distinctive about proceedings involving European 
agencies, as compared to the other procedural models existing in the Community legal 
order.  The concurrence, in various forms, of Community authorities, mixed offices, 
and national administrations renders such proceedings “composite proceedings.”13 
However, these administrative procedures are subject exclusively to Community 
law (contrary to most composite proceedings), which establishes and regulates in a 
very detailed way the participation of supranational and national agencies in rendering 
 
 13. The notion of composite proceedings has been initially worked out by CLAUDIO FRANCHINI, 
AMMINISTRAZIONE ITALIANA E AMMINISTRAZIONE COMUNITARIA.  LA COAMMINISTRAZIONE NEI SETTORI DI 
INTERESSE COMUNITARIO, 174 (2nd ed. 1993).  In these terms, it has been used by Guido Greco, who main-
tains that “the peculiarity of such institutions . . . is given not only by the joined participation (each time with 
heterogeneous roles and functions) of different authorities belonging to a different order, within a single proce-
dure, but also and mainly by the different regime to which the single segments of the procedure are subject.” 
Guido Greco, Incidenza del diritto comunitario sugli atti amministrativi italiani, in TRATTATO DI DIRITTO 
AMMINISTRATIVO EUROPEO 505, 594-95 (1997).  As recently highlighted, various European proceedings can 
be correctly defined as composite.  In particular, it is possible to qualify as composite “the proceedings in 
which, in different forms, the Commission and the national administrations concur, which excludes, therefore, 
those in which the States are involved as mere addressees of the Community action, such as in the case of 
Community measures concerning state aids.”  See Sabino Cassese, supra note 2, at 43.  The problematic aspects 
of composite proceedings, concerning most of all the judicial protection of the concerned subjects, are 
discussed in particular by Mario Pilade Chiti, Principio di sussidiarietà, pubblica amministrazione e diritto 
amministrativo, in DIRITTO PUBBLICO, 505, 517-19 (1995); Mario Pilade Chiti, I procedimenti composti nel 
diritto comunitario e nel diritto interno, in QUADERNI DEL CONSIGLIO DI STATO, ATTIVITÀ AMMINISTRATIVA E 
TUTELA DEGLI INTERESSATI.  L’INFLUENZA DEL DIRITTO COMUNITARIO 55 (1997); see Claudio Franchini, 
Nuovi modelli di azione comunitaria e tutela giurisdizionale, in DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO 81 (2000).  For an 
updated discussion of the notion of composite proceedings, see Giacinto della Cananea, The European Union’s 
Mixed Administrative Proceedings, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (Winter 2004).  For a general reconstruc-
tion of the matter and a functional typology of the proceedings involving a finality of composition, see Sabino 
Cassese, supra note 6. 
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the final determination. In contrast to many types of composite proceedings, these 
procedures do not introduce a new layer of procedure on top of pre-existing national 
procedure.14  Rather, this form of European legislation establishes a comprehensive 
procedure, involving and integrating a number of supranational and national authori-
ties. It would be wrong, however, to confuse such proceedings with comitology com-
mittees.15  Although both are set down comprehensively and exclusively in Commu-
nity law, the nature of the administrative bodies involved is very different.  
Comitology proceedings involve the Commission and committees composed of repre-
sentatives of the Member States.16  In contrast, the proceedings considered here in-
volve decentralized Community offices—European agencies.  The European agency 
replaces the Commission, and national administrative agencies are involved directly, 
not only through the medium of a national representative as in comitology proceed-
ings. 
Other distinctive features can be discerned from administrative practice, features 
which further improve integration among the competent offices and many of which 
were not anticipated by the original legislation. The administration of new drug ap-
provals is the most interesting case, since it shows the tendency of the roles of the 
various offices to overlap and blend rather than remain separate and distinct. For in-
stance, the  European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products takes part, 
through its experts, in all of the meetings both of the pharmaceutical committees as-
sisting the Commission and of the working groups organized by such committees.17  
Through this device, the scientific expertise of both the Agency and the pharmaceuti-
cal committees is integrated.  Indeed, the opinions of the scientific committee internal 
to the Agency, usually adopted unanimously, are generally not the subject of further 
debate in the Commission's pharmaceuticals committees.18  Moreover, the officials 
and experts in the Agency establish informal contacts with  pharmaceutical companies 
and associations representing  consumers and patients. The administration of new drug 
approvals ensures the  integration of the many European public bodies involved not so 
much through a rigid division and distribution of tasks as much as  through a fusion of 
such tasks in a technical-bureaucratic continuum. 
 
 14. Guido Greco, supra note 13, at 592. 
 15. Council Decision 468/99, 1999 O.J. (L 184) 1 (laying down the procedures for the exercise of imple-
menting powers conferred on the Commission); see also Case C-378/00, Commission of the European Com-
munities v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2003 E.C.R. I-937. 
 16. On the nature of the comitology committees, see Case T-188/97 Rothmans International BV v. Com-
mission of the European Communities, 1999 E.C.R. II-2463; see also Case T-111/00, British American To-
bacco International (Investments) v. Commission of the European Communities, 2001 E.C.R. II-2997. 
 17. OFFICE OF THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRD GENERAL 
REPORT—1997 ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR THE EVALUATION OF MEDICINAL 
PRODUCTS (1998). 
 18. OFFICE OF THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SIXTH GENERAL 
REPORT—2000 ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR THE EVALUATION OF MEDICINAL 
PRODUCTS (2001). 
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III 
PROCEDURALIZATION AND COMPETITION BETWEEN NATIONAL AUTHORITIES 
The above reconstruction of proceedings involving European agencies is not compre-
hensive.  In particular, the new drug approval regime presents a number of anomalies.  
A medicinal product can be authorized either through the centralized Community pro-
cedure examined above or through a procedure known as “decentralized authoriza-
tion” or “mutual recognition.”  An authorization granted through the centralized pro-
cedure, is valid in all the Member States.19  The decentralized process operates as 
follows: (1) the national medicinals agency issues an authorization valid for its terri-
tory and based partly on national law, partly on Community law (Directives 2001/82 
and 2001/83), (2) the national authorization is recognized by other Member States as 
valid for their territories too (Directives 2001/82 and 2001/83), and (3) in the event 
that other Member States deny mutual recognition to the national authorization, a pro-
ceeding to resolve the matter is held before the Community authorities (also regulated 
by Directives 2001/82 and 2001/83). 
Contrary to what one might suppose, such a process does not lead to full competi-
tion between national and Community laws.  The producers of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts cannot freely choose the procedure (centralized or decentralized) that they con-
sider more convenient.  Rather, they are bound by the criterion established by 
Regulation 726/2004.  According to this law, the centralized Community procedure is 
compulsory for medicinal products developed through biotechnological processes, but 
optional for other pharmaceutical products constituting a significant innovation.20  For 
all other products—the majority of commercial pharmaceutical products—the pro-
ducer must obtain an authorization through the decentralized process.  The authoriza-
tion is valid only within the national territory, but following the authorization, the 
producer can begin the proceedings for recognition of the authorization in the other 
Member States.  Therefore, pharmaceutical companies can choose between these two 
procedures only with respect to a circumscribed group of products, for which a cen-
tralized procedure is optional.  The competition between legal systems is, instead, 
with regard to the relationships between various national laws.  These legal systems 
compete within the decentralized authorization procedure.  Therefore, although drug 
manufacturers cannot generally choose between the Community and the decentralized 
procedure, they can decide in which Member State to begin the decentralized proce-
dure.21 
A complex scheme is thus realized.  First, the chosen pattern is an alternative to 
the model of full harmonization, insofar as the national regimes are maintained and 
the new supranational process coexists with them.  Second, the companies active in 
 
 19. OFFICE OF THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SIXTH GENERAL 
REPORT—2000 ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR THE EVALUATION OF MEDICINAL 
PRODUCTS (2001). 
 20. Council Regulation 726/2004, art. 3(1-2), 2004 O.J. (L 136) 1. 
 21. For an enlightening discussion of the search for the most convenient regulatory regime, see Sabino 
Cassese, L’arena pubblica. Nuovi paradigmi per lo Stato, in RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO 601, 
637-41 (2001). 
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this sector of the internal market do not have the option of choosing, from case to 
case, between the Community and national regime.  They are obligated to respect the 
rule fixed by the European legislation providing the procedure to be followed for the 
various types of products, and leaving the companies the option to choose only for a 
limited number of products for which the centralized procedure is optional.  At the 
same time, European legislation, by partially harmonizing national laws, makes it pos-
sible for those being regulated, in the context of the decentralized authorization proce-
dure, to choose the Member State and the national regulator considered most favor-
able to its interests. 
In terms of the project of this Article—reconstructing the features of European 
agency proceedings—this scheme reflects a double regulatory technique.  On the one 
hand, the centralized procedure aims at ordering the intervention of each office in the 
process of protecting the public interest.  This aim is pursued through a procedure 
based on the joint participation of national, Community, and mixed administrations, 
but regulated by detailed European legislation.  On the other hand, the centralized 
procedure coexists with the decentralized or mutual recognition procedure, differing 
from the centralized proceedings in two respects.  First, integration of the competent 
offices is combined with competition between national public powers, so that these 
are at the same time called to both collaborate and compete with each other.  Second, 
the procedural sequence does not fall under the category of composite proceedings, 
and is instead made up of a number of connected proceedings.  This is because the 
procedure that chronologically and logically precedes a particular outcome determines 
the annulment of the subsequent proceedings; but the result of these subsequent pro-
ceedings is not conditioned on a positive outcome in the previous proceeding.22 
Understandably, these two patterns are qualitatively distinct from both the pur-
sued aims and the modes through which these aims are accomplished.  Their co-
occurrence in some of the systems coordinated by the European agencies allows them 
to maintain that the administrative proceedings perform the function of ensuring the 
interconnection and interdependence between the various competent offices.  But the 
overall structure laid down by the Community legislation presupposes, in some cases, 
a certain degree of competition between national public powers.  When this happens, 
the action of the administrations (supranational, national, and mixed) is ordered not in 
a single Community procedure, but in several (national and Community) inter-
connected proceedings.  In this situation, the public national powers perform dual 
roles: administrators (as co-authors of the administrative activity), and parties (in case 
of a conflict whose composition is attributed to the supranational authorities). 
The competition between the public powers of the various Members States is rich 
with consequences.  It suggests, for instance, the possibility for the regulated entity to 
exploit the opportunities resulting from multiple regulators, by establishing implicit 
 
 22. On the difference between composite proceedings and procedural sequences made up of inter-
connected proceedings, see della Cananea, supra note 13. 
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“alliances” with some authorities and by using the possibilities offered by Community 
law to the detriment of other regulators (and other regulated entities).23 
The importance of competition between national public powers, however, should 
not be exaggerated.  First, competition occurs only in limited circumstances, such as 
cases in which the procedure gives order to the intervention of the various administra-
tions without creating possible conflicts between them that are quantitatively prevail-
ing.  Second, even if it is not a real anomaly of the system, the competition between 
Member States’ public powers is conceived as a sub-optimal solution, resulting from a 
political compromise aimed at avoiding an excessive strengthening of the center (the 
Community) to the detriment of the periphery (the national legal orders).  A wider ap-
plication of the centralized authorization procedure would be preferable to such a so-
lution.  This interpretation is corroborated by the administrative practice. 
The data collected during the first years of the Community’s legislation on phar-
maceutical products illustrates that, in cases in which the centralized procedure is op-
tional—allowing pharmaceutical companies to choose between two possible proce-
dures—the companies prefer the Community centralized procedure rather than the 
procedure of mutual recognition.24  That is, when it is possible to choose between the 
two procedures, Community law is considered more convenient by the producing 
companies. 
However, with regard to the decentralized procedure, recent studies25 have shown 
a hierarchy in the preferences of the producing companies, which tend to choose cer-
tain Member States (in particular, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Holland and Den-
mark) over others (Greece and Luxembourg).  Such studies have hypothesized that the 
choice of the Member State in which the procedure is started is due to specific charac-
teristics of the national administrative system—in particular, the technical knowledge 
 
 23. The “games with the rules” typical of the exercise of the regulatory function and connected with the 
multiplication of the regulators and with the competition among regulatory regimes are discussed by Sabino 
Cassese, Dalle regole del gioco al gioco con le regole, in MERCATO CONCORRENZA REGOLE, 276 et seq., 
(2002). 
 24. As a matter of fact, for the products for which the centralized procedure is only optional, between 1995 
and 2000, 113 were applications for the authorization through the centralized procedure, while 73 were through 
the procedure of mutual recognition. The statistical data have been collected by the Commission in its Report 
on the experience acquired as a result of the operation of the procedures laid down in Council Regulation 
2309/93, 1993 O.J. (L 214) 1), Council Directive 75/319, chpt. 3, 1975 O.J. (L 147) 1 and in chpt. IV of Coun-
cil Directive 81/851, chpt. 4, 1981 O.J. (L 317) 1, worked out in October 2001 and forthcoming.  However, it 
should be considered that a comparison of the percentage of applications through the two procedures in the sin-
gle years shows that the preference for the centralized procedure is not constant: the centralized procedure was 
preferred in 80% of cases in 1995, 49% in 1997, and 77% in 2000.  Id. 
 25. See CAMERON MCKENNA AND ANDERSEN CONSULTING, “CAMERON-MCKENNA-ANDERSEN 
REPORT” (2000), assessing the functioning of the authorization procedures between 1995 and 1999, available at 
http://pharmacos.eudra.org (last visited Oct. 28, 2004); see also the EFPIA SURVEY ON THE MUTUAL 
RECOGNITION PROCEDURE (2000), available at http://pharmacos.eudra.org (last visited Oct. 28, 2004); see also 
EVALUATION OF THE OPERATION OF THE COMMUNITY PROCEDURES FOR THE AUTHORISATION OF MEDICINAL 
PRODUCTS, elaborated by the Commission, available at http://pharmacos.eudra.org (last visited Oct. 28, 2004); 
see also the report by the MUTUAL RECOGNITION FACILITATING GROUP, ANALYSIS OF WITHDRAWALS IN THE 
MUTUAL RECOGNITION PROCEDURE (2001), available at http://pharmacos.eudra.org (last visited Oct. 28, 
2004). 
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and experience of the competent administration, as well as the rapidity of its action.26  
On the whole, however, the decentralized procedure is not considered satisfactory to 
either the involved companies (that complain about increases in already expensive 
product costs), or the Commission (because of market fragmentation that results from 
the small likelihood that decentralized procedure will be used to obtain authorizations 
in all the fifteen Member States).27 
IV 
THE PROTECTION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 
Having examined the composite function among the competent administrations, it 
is now necessary to investigate the regulation of proceedings involving European 
agencies—specifically, those proceedings involving the procedural protection granted 
both to the parties to the proceedings and to third parties.  The regulation of the Com-
munity trademark again supplies an example.  Community trademark regulation pro-
vides a wide range of procedural guarantees for the applicant as well as for third par-
ties, both in the specific and general parts of the basic law (Regulation 40/94). 
Regarding single procedures, trademark registration procedures grant both the par-
ties to the proceedings and third parties a wide series of procedural rights.  These 
range from the right to be informed to the right to submit written observations and 
give notice of opposition to trademark registration.28  Regarding the principles com-
mon to the various proceedings, procedural phases before the Office that call for giv-
ing or obtaining evidence must be adversarial in nature.  The parties have to be in-
formed of a witness or expert hearing before the Office, and have the right to be 
present and to put questions to the witness or expert.29  Above all, the decisions of the 
Office—which have to state the reasons on which they are based—“shall be based 
only on reasons or evidence on which the parties concerned have had an opportunity 
to present their comments.”30 
In addition to these provisions, Article 79 of Regulation 40/94 provides that in the 
absence of procedural provisions in either Regulation 40/94, the implementing regula-
tion, the fee regulations, or the rules of procedure of the Boards of Appeal, the “Office 
shall take into account the principles of procedural law generally recognized in the 
Member States.”31  This reference in Article 79 should not at all be underestimated, 
 
 26. See Sabino Cassese, supra note 21, at 638-40.  The analysis of the administrative practice allows a 
more accurate interpretation of the legal regime.  On the one hand, it reveals the dynamics primed by a regula-
tory framework based on the competition among national legal regimes and, though to a lesser extent, between 
these and European law.  On the other hand, it shows the shortcomings of the current legislation and the desir-
ability of an extension of the scope of application of the centralized procedure. 
 27. See Commission, supra note 24.  The preference of the European institutions for the centralized proce-
dure has led to the extension of its scope of application by Regulation 726/2004. Supra note 20. 
 28. The most complex case concerns opposition, since it opens an adversarial procedure between the par-
ties on the registration of the trade mark. Regulation 40/94, art. 42, supra note 11.  For an analysis of the provi-
sions concerning the registration procedure and the other proceedings regulated by Regulation 40/94, see 
EDOARDO CHITI, supra note 3, at 133 et seq. 
 29. Regulation 40/94, art. 76, supra note 11. 
 30. Id. at art. 73. 
 31. Id. at  art. 79. 
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since it implies that the Office can, on the one hand, recall the principles already sin-
gled out by the Court of Justice (such as the “rights of the defence,” including the 
equality of arms, the right to be heard, the right to be informed and the right to be rep-
resented or assisted), and, on the other, enrich such a catalogue, even if only within 
the area of Community trademarks.32  Among the principles to which the Office might 
refer, the principles of administrative law established by the Council of Europe in its 
study concerning the relationship between administrative authorities and private per-
sons should be included.  These principles add to the list of the European Court of Jus-
tice the following: the right to make representations to an administrative authority and 
to submit facts, evidence, and arguments; the duty to complete the different procedural 
stages within a reasonable time; the public administrations’ duty to notify the indi-
viduals concerned of the administrative act; and the duty to implement within a rea-
sonable time those administrative acts that grant a right or safeguard a private individ-
ual’s interest.33 
The Community trademarks example is not an isolated case.  Granting interested 
parties several remarkable procedural rights is common to all the provisions governing 
proceedings involving European agencies—both when they give rise to Community, 
but polycentric, proceedings (as in the case of proceedings to grant a plant variety 
right), and when they provide connected proceedings (as in the case of decentralized 
procedures authorizing pharmaceutical products).  More precisely, such provisions are 
specific applications of the so called “interest representation model,”34 where they im-
pose “a regulation model founded on the participation of interests, so as to ensure de-
cisions grounded on the knowledge of facts and on a reasonable and justified balance 
of the interests.”35 
In this sense, we see a clear connection between the effectiveness of both proce-
dural protections and Community law, since the protection of private actors in the 
proceedings is functional to guarantee not only their subjective positions, but also the 
 
 32. With specific reference to the Community order, see HANS PETER NEHL, PRINCIPLES OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN EC LAW (1999); among the oldest studies, see Albrecht Weber, Il diritto am-
ministrativo procedimentale nell’ordinamento della Comunità europea, in RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO 
PUBBLICO COMUNITARIO393 et seq., (1992); Valentine Korah, The Rights of the Defence in Administrative 
Proceedings under Community Law, in CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 73 et seq., (1980); for a theoretical per-
spective on the matter, see CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY, LEGAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS, THEIR 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THEIR RIGHTS OF DEFENCE, in LES SANCTIONS COMME MOYENS DE MISE EN 
OEUVRE DU DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE, KÖLN, BUNDESANZEIGER 115 et seq., (1996). 
 33. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE ADMINISTRATION AND YOU – A HANDBOOK, (1997).  Less detailed, but 
interesting all the same for its comparative approach, the study of the Italian Consiglio di Stato on the principles 
of administrative law common to the Member States see IL DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO NEI PAESI CEE: PRINCIPI 
COMUNI. ATTI DEL COLLOQUIO FRA CONSIGLI DI STATO E GIURISDIZIONI AMMINISTRATIVE SUPREME DELLA 
CEE (1994). 
 34. The main features of the model are, on the one hand, the attention devoted to the emerging of interests 
that might influence public decisions, and on the other hand, the fact that instead of being hierarchically ordered 
by the legislation, such interests are compared in the framework of the administrative law procedure. See Luisa 
Torchia, I modelli di procedimento amministrativo, in IL PROCEDIMENTO AMMINISTRATIVO: PROFILI 
COMPARATI, 33 et seq., (Luisa Torchia ed. 1993) (a synthesis of the model); Richard Stewart, The Reformation 
of American Administrative Law, in HARV. L. REV., 1667 et seq., (1975); Richard Steward, Madison’s Night-
mare, in U. CHI. L. REV., 335 et seq., (1990); STEPHEN BREYER, CASS SUNSTEIN, AND RICHARD STEWART, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT AND CASES (5th ed., 2002). 
 35. Sabino Cassese, supra note 2, at 47. 
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full emergence of facts and interests and, therefore, the full effectiveness of adminis-
trative implementation of European legislation.  This arrangement, based on a consid-
eration of all the interested parties’ opinions, is functionally complementary to the co-
participation of national, supranational and mixed authorities in the exercise of a 
Community function. 
In contrast with what happens in other areas involving the action of the European 
Community, these cases do not involve a system founded on the balance between 
command and control on the one hand, and on the other a game of preferences in 
which national governments are captured together with private actors.36  The provi-
sions under discussion instead give rise to a less flexible model, and one based on a 
clearer distinction between public activities and private powers.  On the one hand, 
Community, national, and composite authorities work jointly for the exercise of a 
Community function, according to a scheme in which the need for cooperation pre-
dominates over competition between public powers (which is therefore marginal and 
not considered an optimal mechanism for the working of the European administra-
tion).  On the other hand, in their role as interested parties, private subjects are called 
to act in two ways: to supervise public powers’ actions and to contribute to the com-
pleteness of facts and interest identification and representation in the activities of this 
transnational “network” of public powers, which stands before them unified, even 
though this network is based on the participation of structurally separate offices. 
This is clear with respect to those hypotheses—representing the central structure 
of the overall procedural arrangement—in which the European regulation provides 
proceedings that are composite but minutely regulated by Community law.  However, 
this conclusion is not undermined by the existence of connected procedures. If it is 
true that in similar hypotheses a more complex game between regulators and regulated 
is possible, it is also true that there are fewer actual cases in which this more complex 
game plays itself out.  In practice, such a game takes place very rarely.  When it does, 
it does so in a way that cannot be compared to the models of functioning of other ar-
eas in the European order. 
Finally, the model of “interest representation” is not always sufficiently worked 
out.  The most significant example concerns pharmaceutical products regulation, in 
which the procedural design turns out to be much less developed than the example 
concerning Community trademark administration. 
Consider first the scarce consideration given to consumers, patients, and interested 
parties other than the applicant.  To them, the European regime dedicates few provi-
sions, providing little encouragement—providing, for example, that “the Management 
Board shall, in agreement with the Commission, develop appropriate contacts between 
the Agency and the representatives of the industry, consumers and patients and the 
health professions.”37  Moreover, the Agency must publish an assessment report on the 
 
 36. This is what happens, for example, in the sector of competition law.  For a discussion of this specific 
type of functioning of the European administration see Sabino Cassese, supra note 2, at 42-43. 
 37. Regulation 726/2004, art. 78, supra note 20.  Such provision, already envisioned by Regulation 
2309/93, has been enforced in three main ways: first, through conferences attended by representatives of indus-
try, national authorities, and Community institutions; second, through annual meetings with the representatives 
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given medicinal product for human use, drawn up by the scientific committee, and 
must outline the reasons for its opinion in favor of granting authorization after delet-
ing of any information of a commercially confidential nature.38 
The lack of non-applicant interests and procedural rights makes salient a distin-
guishing feature of the overall regulatory model.  In contrast to the experiences of 
other legal systems in corresponding areas, the Community scheme adopts an exclu-
sively technical approach regarding the risk factor, since the relevant criterion for the 
analysis of risk is the potential hazard to human beings and ecosystems associated 
with a given action.39  In other words, risk is defined as the sum total of the expected 
physical damage and/or of other undesirable effects on persons or ecosystems, calcu-
lated on the basis of a scientific study of the relationship between a potentially haz-
ardous agent and its harmful effects observed in persons or other living organisms.  
The goal of this approach is the identification of possible hazards, and the specifica-
tion of their probability.  The technical analysis of risk factors, performed by scientists 
operating in the context of Community pharmaceutical administration, is thus not fol-
lowed by a broader consideration of a cost-benefit analysis, nor is it mediated through 
processes able to furnish social or cultural interpretations of the undesirable events. 
From a more strictly legal standpoint, the greatest gap in the current regulatory 
framework is that of “equal access of groups to knowledge of what government is do-
ing and contemplates doing and equal access of groups to the discussion leading up to 
the regulatory agencies’ decisions.”40  While recognizing the possibility of multiple 
options,41 the question of equal participation cannot be evaded by Community law-
makers: “while equalizing participation in regulatory decision-making may not guar-
 
of industry, health professions, consumers, and patients; finally, through the promotion of a dialogue with 
pharmaceutical companies in the initial stages of the research programmes, usually arranged several years be-
fore the application of the commercial authorization.  In addition to the previous regime, Regulation 726/2004 
also provides the possibility that the committees of the Agency “shall in general matters establish contacts, on 
an advisory basis, with parties concerned with the use of medicinal products, in particular patient organizations 
and health-care professionals’ associations.” Regulation 726/2004, art. 78(2), supra note 20. On the participa-
tion of the interested parties in the activities of the Community public powers, see the general studies by 
Deirdre Curtin, “Civil Society” and the European Union: Opening Spaces for Deliberative Democracy, in 
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW 185 (1999); Lothar Maier, Institutional Consumer 
Representation in the European Community, in EUROPEAN CONSUMER POLICY AFTER MAASTRICHT 89 (Nor-
bert Reich and Geoffrey Woodroffe eds. 1994); Wolfgang Streeck, Community, Market, State—and Associa-
tions? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order, in European University Institute 
Working Papers, 94 (1984). 
 38. Regulation 726/2004, art. 13(3), supra note 20; see also the decision concerning the rules for the ac-
cess to the documents held by the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, adopted by the 
Executive Director (Dec. 3, 1997).  Available at http://europa.eu.int/agencies/emea/index_en.htm (last visited, 
Nov. 11, 2004). 
 39. See the classification by Ortwin Renn, Concepts of risk: a Classification, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 
53 ( Sheldon Krimsky and Dominic Golding eds. 1992). 
 40. Martin Shapiro, Equality and Diversity, in EUR. REV. PUB. L., 371, 387 (1999). 
 41. Cf., the debate on the possible codification of principles and rules of administrative procedure in 
Community law; see Carol Harlow, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE, 17-19 
(European University Institute Working Papers—RSC, 98/23), see also Carol Harlow, CODIFICATION OF EC 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES? FITTING THE FOOT TO THE SHOE OR THE SHOE TO THE FOOT (Jean Monnet 
Chair Papers, European University Institute - RSC, 1995).  See also Mark Shapiro, Codification of Administra-
tive Law: The US and the Union, in EUR. L. JOUR., 26 (1996). 
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antee that regulation will yield net substantive gains in economic and social equality, 
unequal participation will almost certainly guarantee that such gains will not occur.”42 
V 
ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROCEDURALIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE 
FUNCTION 
The proceduralization of the European administrative function constitutes a spe-
cific technique of administrative integration.  Community legislation has not concen-
trated the exercise of a certain administrative function in a single body characterized 
by a particular nature.  Rather, it has distributed the attributes necessary to carry out 
the Community function among a plurality of offices (supranational, national, and 
mixed), whose integration derives from Community proceedings regulating the time 
and modalities of the connections among various competent administrations. 
Proceduralization of the administrative function also serves a different purpose.  
Applying the “interest representation” model, proceduralization encourages private 
subjects to take part in the action of the transnational “network” of public powers, 
with a view toward controlling the activity of those public powers, as well as toward 
guaranteeing that recognition and representation of facts and interests are complete. 
Let us now briefly consider cases in which the activity carried out by the admini-
strations coordinated by the European agencies is not proceduralized.  The examina-
tion of the relevant provisions turns out to be useful, allowing alternatives to the pro-
ceduralization of the administrative function to be defined as a mechanism of 
administrative composition.  Among the cases so far considered, these non-
proceduralized activities are quantitatively prevailing.  In most instances, rather than 
distributing the activity among a plurality of subjects, Community legislation has pro-
vided that the activity shall be carried out by a complex organization,43 sometimes de-
fined as a “network.”44  This is expressly defined, in functional terms, as the totality of 
the activities required to accomplish the Community administrative function. In struc-
tural terms, it is defined in reference to the totality of the competent offices.  Within 
the framework of such complex administration, the contextually established European 
agency is assigned the task of coordinating the different competent offices, as well as 
of specifying and planning their activities.  In order to perform this coordination and 
planning function, non-binding legal instruments are provided, aimed at achieving in a 
non-coercive way expected standards of behavior for the different competent offices.45 
Differently from the hypotheses so far examined, therefore, the unified character 
of the administrative system is not the result of a provision for administrative proceed-
 
 42. Martin Shapiro, supra note 40,  at 377. 
 43. Or, using a different terminology, within such a complex organization. 
 44. See, e.g., Council Regulation 1210/90, art. 4, 1990 O.J. (L 120) 1, as amended by Council Regulation 
933/99, 1999 O.J. (L 117) 1 and Council Regulation 302/93, art. 5, 1993 O.J. (L 36) 1, as amended by Council 
Regulation 3294/94, 1994 O.J. (L 341) 1. 
 45. This is the case, for example, of the work program adopted by the European Environment Agency and 
the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction.  See Regulation 1210/90, art. 8(4-5), supra 
note 44.  See also Regulation 302/93, art. 8(3-4), supra note 44. 
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ings and for a complex set of organizational relationships between the various respon-
sible offices.  Rather, it derives from an explicit characterization of the relevant 
Community legislation and from the provisions assigning the European agency spe-
cific coordinating and organizational tasks, to be accomplished through “soft law” 
measures. 
The peculiarity of this legal structure lies not so much in the legally non-binding 
nature of the instruments conferred on European agencies—which orient the activity 
of the offices they refer to on a non-compulsory basis—as much as in the use of these 
kinds of instruments, giving rise to a series of operative relationships that allow the 
development functional complementariness and interdependence among the various 
competent bodies.46 
Furthermore, the tools under examination bring into being a set of conditions at 
once limiting and enabling the involved administrations, for the purpose of making 
possible cooperative behavior, to the extent that the aim is to reach an agreement on 
the interpretation of a specific situation or on the mutual coordination of the respective 
plans of action. 
It is on these grounds that it is possible to clarify the reasons for the recourse to 
similar legal instruments.  They seem to find their functional foundation in the pecu-
liar nature of the performed activity, which is characterized by the totality of the inter-
pretative processes arising among the offices assigned the task of producing informa-
tion, and eluding the cohesive force produced by the traditional organizational and 
procedural tools.47 
In addition to this, the complexity of these interpretative processes accounts for 
the tendency to multiply the hypotheses in which the single offices engage in forms of 
voluntary cooperation.  In other words, order and stability in the administrative net-
work are sought and possibly obtained not only by European agency’s adoption of 
non-binding measures provided under Community law itself, but also by the develop-
ment of a panoply of “soft law” instruments that are not specifically contemplated by 
Community law, and that are aimed at integrating the measures adopted by the supra-
national body in order to facilitate the effective coordination of the competent of-
fices.48 
 
 46. The administrative order resulting from recourse to this technique is therefore at once spontaneous and 
externally determined.  It is spontaneous because the relationships underlying it are freely developed in the in-
teractions between the various offices and cannot be predefined by the Community legislation.  It is externally 
determined because such relationships take place within the context of a series of non-binding measures 
adopted by the European agency in accordance with the establishing Community regulation.  Moreover, such 
administrative order has an empirical nature and may be continuously modified and readily adapted to changing 
conditions. 
 47. From the perspective of administrative science, the point is further developed in Edoardo Chiti, supra 
note 1; see also Les Metcalfe, Etablissement de liens entre les différents niveaux de gouvernance: intégration 
européenne et mondialisation, in REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SCIENCES ADMINISTRATIVES 139 (2000). 
 48. This tendency is particularly clear with reference to the administration of environmental information, 
where the adoption by the European Environment Agency of the work program constitutes the general frame-
work within which a great number of organizational and procedural mechanisms of voluntary cooperation are 
set up by the single components of the “network.” 
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Under other profiles, however, the technique of administrative integration through 
non-legally binding acts seems closer to the technique based on proceduralization of 
the administrative function, and on the organizational relations among the competent 
offices.  Coordination and planning powers by the Community body tend to produce 
forms of hierarchical ordering between the various subjects, which makes incorrect 
the usual political representations of the “network” as a mainly horizontal decisional 
space.49 
These two techniques are not necessarily exclusive.  They can complement each 
other depending on the peculiarity of the activity to be carried out.  The pharmaceuti-
cal products regime illustrates such an example.  On the one hand, this regime is struc-
tured around the administrative function’s proceduralization and the establishment of 
a series of organizational relationships among the administrations assigned to accom-
plish the relevant tasks.  On the other hand, it is based on various forms of spontane-
ous cooperation involving those administrations, which result in a partial modification 
of the design established by Community legislation. 
The non-proceduralization of administrative activity is relevant not only with ref-
erence to the mechanisms of administrative integration; it also has to be evaluated 
with regard to the interests at stake.  From this point of view, information production 
can immediately assume the connotation of an activity instrumental to the develop-
ment of various administrative functions.  It can be aimed at allowing a more effective 
exercise of decisionmaking powers by the competent authorities in particular policy 
areas.  In specific cases, however, the information process acquires the features of an 
autonomous public function carried out for the social community, both to enable it to 
assess the action of the public powers, and to encourage or discourage the behaviour 
of some actors.50 
In both cases, however, the information process can be used to regulate private 
subjects’ behavior, even through different modalities.  Sometimes, in fact, the compe-
tent public powers work out and publish data with a warning or persuading function to 
induce the private companies to orient their behavior toward specific purposes (such 
as environmental protection).  In other circumstances, the information process is 
univocally directed towards the analysis of a technical matter, and toward assisting a 
certain authority its decisionmaking powers.  Such an analysis thus acquires the char-
acter of a real opinion. 
These remarks raise a problem concerning administrative development.  If these 
observations prevent us from considering studies produced by information networks 
(and coordinated by European agencies) as technical evaluations resulting from re-
search activity that “is, as such, informal,”51 the lack of formalized procedures, rules, 
and principles of administrative action result in surprising gaps under a dual point of 
view. 
 
 49. For an account of this phenomenon in the environmental information sector, see EDOARDO CHITI, su-
pra note 3, at 301 et seq. 
 50. From the perspective of political science, this point is made by Giandomenico Majone, The New Euro-
pean Agencies: Regulation by Information, in JOUR. EURO. PUB. POL., 262 (1997). 
 51. MASSIMO SEVERO GIANNINI, supra note 10, vol. II at 39. 
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Environmental information is also affected by risk management—as we can see in 
the pharmaceutical products regime—in particular regarding interested party partici-
pation in the proceedings. 
Regarding risk management, there are a number of ambiguities specifically in-
volving the production of information.  The area of drugs and drug addiction provides 
a concise, illustrative example.  The Community legal regime in this policy area as-
signs the role of gathering and managing aggregate (rather than individual) data to the 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction.52  The Centre is thus de-
signed as an office for the study of drugs and drug addiction as a whole, rather than as 
a branch of police administration responsible for the collection, analysis, and publica-
tion of information about individual cases.  In practice, however, the data collected of-
ten refer to single cases, insofar as the sources of such information are hospitals, 
courts, prisons, and police stations, all of which transmit the relevant data to the mem-
bers of the Reitox organization in individual form.  Surprisingly, the Community pro-
visions regulating this sector do not in any way regulate the procedures used for con-
veying information from the source to the recipient: there are no provisions regarding 
the anonymity, analysis, the selection of data in the information production process.  
Community legislation has therefore failed to develop an adequate corpus of proce-
dural provisions to regulate the various steps through which each individual case is 
transformed into aggregate data within the information chain.  This specific case 
shows, more generally, that the production of information is problematic looked at in 
a number of perspectives; and that issues regarding procedure deserve much greater 
attention than they receives now under the current legal framework—taking a cue 
from European statistics, an area in many ways analogous to that of Community in-
formation agencies and regulated by a sophisticated set of provisions. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined, and attempted to reconstruct, the regulation of pro-
ceedings involving European agencies.  In the context of this attempted reconstruc-
tion, five aspects of this procedural arrangement are significant. 
First, the proceduralization of the administrative function is instrumental to stabi-
lizing the cooperation between plural competent offices (national, supranational, and 
mixed), through modes that are subtracted from the negotiation of the single authori-
ties.  This implies a specific type of administrative proceeding, which can be consid-
ered “Community” in nature.  At the same time, however, it is based on the participa-
tion of structurally distinct authorities.  In some a few, minor cases, however, 
integration of the competent offices combines with competition between national pub-
lic powers.  Both are thus called to collaborate and compete with each other.  Such a 
 
 52. Cf. Regulation 302/93 supra note 44, as amended by Regulation 3294/94, art.1(5) and 6(2) note 43, 
according to which the Centre shall not collect any data making it possible to identify individuals or small 
groups of individuals and shall refrain from any transmission of information relating to specific named cases 
and shall not publish or make accessible to the public personal data. 
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different structure is reflected in a distinct procedural technique, characterized by the 
plurality of national and Community proceedings connecting them. 
Second, proceduralization of the administrative function applies the “interest rep-
resentation model.”  Under this model, in order to ensure that fact and interest identi-
fication and representation are complete, a relatively elaborate system of consultation 
mechanisms and private actor participation is at the center of the administrative activ-
ity carried out by the complex administration established by the relevant legislation. 
Third, these two elements are functionally complementary: they are combined in a 
framework structured along two main guidelines.  On the one hand, Community, in-
ternal, and composite authorities work jointly for the exercise of a Community func-
tion, according to a scheme essentially aimed at satisfying the requirements of coop-
eration between public powers.  On the other hand, private actors, in their role as 
interested parties, are called to take part in the action of this complex but unified ad-
ministration, both of controlling the action of the public powers and guaranteeing that 
identification and representation of facts and interests will be complete. 
Fourth, the proceduralization of the administrative function is not a necessary 
element to the regulation of European agency activity.  Many regulations (in particu-
lar, those concerning agencies responsible for coordinating transnational information 
networks) leave out administrative proceedings provisions and are based on alterna-
tive modes for the development of their activities. 
Fifth, these pieces of Community legislation lay down an effective and original 
technique of integration among the variety of competent offices.  This shows that the 
proceduralization of the administrative function concerning the ordered development 
of the activity actually has possible alternatives, including cases in which the number 
of the public powers involved is large.  The absence of formalized procedures and 
principles of procedural activity, however, translates into a lack of both procedural 
guarantees and a real “interest representation model,” which would be useful in the 
areas in question, given the character of the carried-out activity. 
To conclude, let us revisit the question posed at the beginning of this Article: can 
the distinct aspects of proceedings involving European agencies be considered a con-
firmation of the tendencies highlighted by the most advanced legal science, with re-
gard to the development of a real European administrative law?  The answer is no. 
A new element, unknown in the traditions of the Member States’ administrative 
laws, can be singled out in European administrative law: the development of a specific 
version of the “interest representation model,” characterized by the involvement in the 
dialogue and in the debate not only of private actors, but also of States, “reduced to 
the rank of centers for the care of private interests.”53 
On the contrary, in the context of the procedural regulation examined in this Arti-
cle, the “interest representation model” takes on a different connotation.  It stands, 
first of all, as a mechanism aimed at guaranteeing the consultation and the participa-
tion of private parties in the processes of administrative enforcement of Community 
legislation, with a function both of controlling the action of the public powers and of 
 
 53. See Sabino Cassese, supra note 2, at 51. 
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guaranteeing the completeness of the identification and representation of facts and in-
terests.  Then, such a mechanism parallels the functional and structural integration of a 
plurality of public powers (national, supranational, and mixed) in a unified administra-
tion by sector, in which the element of the competition between public powers is fairly 
limited. 
This creates a simpler and at the same time less original aspect than the one typi-
cal of the paradigm of “public arena.”  Simpler, because national administrations and 
private actors are not called to compete on an equal footing in supporting their own 
interests and can exploit only marginally the differences of level in the regulation.  
Less original, because it is characterized by two elements—composition and coopera-
tion on the one hand, and participation on the other—that have undoubted precedents 
in the national administrative systems.  This demonstrates the rich variety of European 
administrative law, the simultaneous presence in it of both original and traditional in-
stitutions, and the sensitive balance between innovation and dependence on the na-
tional legal traditions. 
